Local zone security architecture for retail environments

[0001] This patent application claims priority to previously filed U.S. Provisional patent application No. 60/548,254, filed on Feb. 27, 2004, and incorporated herein by reference in its entirety.

[0002] The present invention relates to a security architecture for retail environments, and more particularly relates to a security architecture for a retail environment having multiple card readers and PINpads and that provides both on-line and off-line PIN validation using a reduced number of secure access modules.

[0003] FIG. 1 illustrates a typical implementation of a self-service terminal (SST) 10 designed to meet the Europay MasterCard Visa (EMV) specification. The EMV specification is an agreed specification between Europay, MasterCard, and Visa for the acceptance of smart chip cards and the handling of PIN data for credit and debit schemes. The objectives of the EMV specification are to reduce fraud, allow off-line secure transactions, allow issuers of the smart chip cards to change card parameters after issuance, and allow multi-application cards.

[0004] The SST 10 includes a controller 12, a Personal Identification Number (PIN) pad 14, and a hybrid card reader 16 including one or more secure access modules (SAMs). The hybrid card reader 16 is a combination magnetic stripe card reader and a smart card reader. A smart card is a type of credit or debit card that contains a microchip having a significant amount of memory for storing various card parameters, which may include a user's PIN. Each of the SAMs included in the card reader 16 contain proprietary information and operate to provide off-line PIN validation for a particular application.

[0005] In operation, a customer's smart card is read by the card reader 16, and the customer enter his PIN into the PINpad 14. The PINpad 14 encrypts the PIN and communicates the encrypted PIN to the controller 12. The controller 12 passes the encrypted PIN to the card reader 16. For off-line validation, the card reader 16 decrypts the PIN using a local key compatible the key used by the PINpad 14 to encrypt the PIN, and the card reader 16 communicates the PIN to the SAMs for validation. Off-line validation allows verification of the customer's PIN on-site without communicating with a remote system. For on-line validation, the controller 12 decrypts the PIN using a local key compatible the key used by the PINpad 14 to encrypt the PIN, and after decrypting the PIN, the card reader 16 encrypts the PIN using a stored bank key and communicates the PIN encrypted using the bank key to a host computer via the POS 18 for PIN validation.

[0006] The SAMs are incorporated into the card reader 16, and the card reader 16 must include a different SAM for each application that the SST 10 is required to support. Accordingly, if an operator installs more than one SST 10 in a retail environment, the operator must purchase a set of SAMs for each card reader 16. Further, the SST 10 is an expensive tamper-resistant unit. When one of the controller 12, PINpad 16, or card reader 16 is faulty, alternative embodiments may require the replacement of the entire SST 10. Since the SST 10 is expensive, it is not desirable to replace the entire SST 10 when only one component is faulty.

[0007] Thus, there remains a need for a retail environment that eliminates the need for a complete set of SAMs for each card reader. There also remains a need for a self-service terminal that eliminates the need to replace the entire terminal when a single component is faulty.

[0008] The present invention provides a security architecture for a retail environment providing both on-line and off-line personal identification number (PIN) validation for a smart card transaction using a reduced number of secure access modules (SAMs). In one embodiment, the retail environment includes a security module and numerous fuel dispensers. However, the retail environment could be an environment other than a fueling environment. Each of the fuel dispensers includes a controller and one or more PINpads and card readers. The security module includes one or more SAMs for off-line PIN validation. Each of the PINpads in each of the fuel dispensers communicates with the security module such that the security module performs either on-line or off-line PIN validation for every PINpad in the retail environment. Accordingly, the security module uses one set of SAMs for off-line validation for every PINpad in the retail environment. Further, the security module stores a set of bank keys used to encrypt PINs for on-line validation by a remote host computer. Accordingly, the security module uses one set of bank keys for on-line validation for every PINpad in the retail environment.

[0009] In one embodiment, each of the fuel dispensers also includes one or more displays, and the controller operates to logically control the displays. More specifically, when the PINpad enters a nonsecure mode of operation to allow a customer to enter alphanumeric information other than a PIN, the controller operates to control the display such that only predefined messages can be displayed. Accordingly, the situation wherein the customer is tricked into entering his PIN while the PINpad is in a nonsecure mode of operation is prevented.

[0010] In one embodiment, communication between the security module and each of the PINpads and between the controller and the card reader is encrypted based on keys generated in numerous local zone sessions. Local zone sessions are initiated between the security module and each of the PINpads. Each of these local zone sessions generates a key used by a corresponding PINpad to encrypt a customer's PIN prior to communicating the PIN to the security module for validation. In each fuel dispenser, local zone sessions are also initiated between the controller and each card reader to generate different keys for encrypted communication between the controller and each of the card readers. In one embodiment, the local zone sessions use an exponential key exchange to generate the corresponding key. The keys may be used to encrypt information using any number of encryption algorithms including, but not limited to, Rivest-Shamir-Adelman algorithm (RSA), the Diffie-Hellman algorithm (DH), the Data Encryption Standard (DES), or one or more of the RSA, DH, and DES algorithms. In one embodiment, the communications may be encrypted using DES using a unique key per transaction (UKPT) or a Master key and a Session key.

[0011] A second embodiment of the present invention provides a retail environment including numerous fuel dispensers each including a self-service terminal (SST) including a controller and two or more PINpads and card readers. The controller includes one or more SAMs for off-line PIN validation and one or more bank keys for on-line PIN validation rather than the SAMs being provided outside the fuel dispenser in a separate security module. Each of the PINpads in the fuel dispenser communicates with the controller such that the controller performs either on-line or off-line PIN validation for every PINpad in the fuel dispenser. Further, the controller stores one set of bank keys used to encrypt PINs for on-line validation by a remote host computer. Accordingly, the controller uses the one set of bank keys for on-line validation for every PINpad in the fuel dispenser.

[0012] In one embodiment, each of the fuel dispensers also includes one or more displays, and the controller operates to logically control the displays. More specifically, when the PINpad enters a nonsecure mode of operation such that a customer can enter alphanumeric information other than a PIN, the controller operates to control the display such that only predefined messages can be displayed. Accordingly, the situation wherein the customer is tricked into entering his PIN while the PINpad is in a nonsecure mode of operation is prevented.

[0013] In one embodiment, communication between the controller and each of the PINpads and card readers is encrypted based on keys generated in numerous local zone sessions. Local zone sessions are initiated between the controller and each of the PINpads and card readers. Each of these local zone sessions generates a key used by a corresponding PINpad or card reader and the controller for encrypted communication. In one embodiment, the local zone sessions use an exponential key exchange (EKE) to generate the corresponding key. The keys may be used to encrypt information using any number of encryption algorithms including, but not limited to, Rivest-Shamir-Adelman algorithm (RSA), the Diffie-Hellman algorithm (DH), the Data Encryption Standard (DES), or one or more of the RSA, DH, and DES algorithms. In one embodiment, the communications may be encrypted using DES using a unique key per transaction (UKPT) or a Master key and a Session key.

[0014] In either embodiment, at least the card readers and PINpads are modular components such that a faulty card reader or PINpad can be replaced without replacing the card readers, PINpads, and controller. Further, each of the card readers, PINpads, and the security module are tamper-evident components.

[0015] Those skilled in the art will appreciate the scope of the present invention and realize additional aspects thereof after reading the following detailed description of the preferred embodiments in association with the accompanying drawing figures.

[0023] The embodiments set forth below represent the necessary information to enable those skilled in the art to practice the invention and illustrate the best mode of practicing the invention. Upon reading the following description in light of the accompanying drawing figures, those skilled in the art will understand the concepts of the invention and will recognize applications of these concepts not particularly addressed herein. It should be understood that these concepts and applications fall within the scope of the disclosure and the accompanying claims.

[0024] The present invention provides a security architecture for a retail environment, such as a fueling environment, providing both on-line and off-line personal identification number (PIN) validation for a smart card transaction using a reduced number of secure access modules (SAMs). Although the following description focuses on a fueling environment, it should be understood that the retail environment of the present invention can be any retail environment, and the description of the present invention in a fueling environment should be considered exemplary rather than limiting.

[0025] FIG. 2 illustrates a fueling environment 20 according to one embodiment of the present invention. The fueling environment 20 includes a point-of-sale (POS) 22, a security module 24, and a plurality of fuel dispensers 26-30. Only the fuel dispenser 26 is illustrated in detail. However, it should be understood that the following discussion of the fuel dispenser 26 equally applies to all of the fuel dispensers 26-30.

[0026] The fuel dispenser 26 is a two-sided fuel dispenser and includes a first side, a second side, and a common controller 32 controlling each component on the first and second sides. The first and second sides include printers 34A and 34B, card readers 36A and 36B, PINpads 38A and 38B, displays 40A and 40B, and soft keys 42A and 42B. The card readers 36A and 36B may be capable of reading both magnetic stripe cards and smart cards or alternatively be capable of reading only smart cards. The first and second sides may also include radio frequency identification circuitries (RFID) 44A and 44B, bar code readers 46A and 46B, cash acceptors 48A and 48B, voice prompt circuitries 50A and 50B, proximity detectors 52A and 52B, and coin acceptors and dispensers 54A and 54B.

[0027] The security module 24 includes one or more secure access modules (SAMs). The SAMs may be part of the security module 24 or may be connected to the security module 24 via a secure interface. The SAMs provide fraud protection and control for various applications using a smart card. The SAMs also allow the security module 24 to perform off-line validation of a customer's PIN based on data read from the customer's smart card. Further, since different smart card applications, such as customer loyalty programs and credit and debit card applications require different processing methods or standards, the security module 24 includes numerous SAMs. Each SAM stores proprietary information necessary to validate a PIN associated with a smart card and match the smart card to a particular application. By using multiple SAMs, the retail environment 20 can implement a variety of smart card-based programs at the same time. For example, one of the SAMs may be used to support Visa credit cards, a second SAM may be used for MasterCard credit cards, a third SAM may be used to handle gift cards, and a fourth SAM may be used to implement a frequent shopper program.

[0028] As illustrated in FIG. 3, in operation, assuming a customer is purchasing fuel on the first side of the fuel dispenser 26, the customer inserts his smart card into the card reader 36A (step 300). The controller 32 then prompts the user to enter his PIN by displaying text on the display 40A or using the voice prompt 50A or using both (step 302). The customer then enters his PIN using the PINpad 38A (step 304). As described below in more detail, the PINpad 38A encrypts the PIN (step 306) and communicates the encrypted PIN to the security module 24 (step 308) via the controller 32 and the POS 22. It should be noted that, in this embodiment, neither the controller 32 or the POS 22 decrypts the PIN. The POS 22 and the controller 32 simply act as gateways to establish a communication path between the PINpad 38A and the security module 24.

[0029] Once the security module 24 receives the encrypted PIN, it decrypts the PIN (step 310). The security module 24 determines whether to perform off-line validation or on-line validation of the PIN (step 312). For off-line validation, the security module 24 communicates the PIN to the SAMs for validation based on data read from the smart card by the card reader 36A (step 314). Each of the SAMs contains proprietary information for a particular application. The proprietary information allows the SAM to validate the PIN without communicating to a remote host computer. Thus, the SAMs allow the PIN to be validated on-site rather than at a remote host computer. For on-line validation, after decrypting the PIN, the security module 24 encrypts the PIN using a corresponding stored bank key (step 316) and communicates the PIN encrypted using the bank key to a host computer (not shown) via the POS 22 for on-line validation based on data read from the smart card by the card reader 36A (step 318).

[0030] Referring back to FIG. 2, it should be noted that the retail environment 20 of FIG. 2 requires only one set of SAMs and one set of stored bank keys. In this embodiment, the SAMs are either incorporated into or securely interfaced to the security module 24, and the bank keys are stored by the security module. In other words, the retail environment 20 avoids the need for a different set of SAMs for each of the PINpads 38A and 38B in each of the dispensers 26-30 and also avoids the need for storing the bank keys in each of the PINpads 38A and 38B in each of the dispensers 26-30.

[0031] In one embodiment, communication between the security module 24 and the PINpads 38A and 38B and communication between the controller 32 and the card readers 36A and 36B utilize an encryption scheme similar to that disclosed in commonly owned U.S. Pat. No. 5,384,850, entitled “SECURITY APPARATUS AND SYSTEM FOR RETAIL ENVIRONMENTS, issued Jan. 24, 1995, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. However, this embodiment is exemplary. Numerous other encryption schemes for encryption and encryption key generation, such as but not limited to PGP, will be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art upon reading this disclosure.

[0032] In general, whenever it is desirable to generate encryption keys, local zone sessions are initiated between various components. Each of the local zone sessions generates an encryption key in the manner described in U.S. Pat. No. 5,384,850. A local zone session between the security module 24 and the first PINpad 38A generates a first encryption key for encrypted communication between the security module 24 and the first PINpad 36A. In one embodiment, the local zone session uses an exponential key exchange between the security module 24 and the first PINpad 36A to generate the first encryption key. In a similar fashion, a local zone session is initiated between the security module 24 and the second PINpad 38B in order to generate a second encryption key for encrypted communication between the security module 24 and the second PINpad 38B. The controller 32 and the POS 22 act as gateways to establish a communication path between the security module 24 and the first and second PINpads 38A and 38B.

[0033] Local zone sessions are also initiated between the controller 32 and each of the card readers 36A and 36B, thereby establishing encryption keys for encrypted communication between the controller 32 and each of the card readers 36A and 36B. The encryption keys generated during the local zone sessions may be used to encrypt communications using any number of encryption algorithms including, but not limited to, Rivest-Shamir-Adelman algorithm (RSA), the Diffie-Hellman algorithm (DH), the Data Encryption Standard (DES), or one or more of the RSA, DH, and DES algorithms. In one embodiment, the communications may be encrypted using DES using a unique key per transaction (UKPT) or a Master key and a Session key.

[0034] As an example, FIG. 4 is a flow chart illustrating a local zone session between the security module 24 and the PINpad 38A. The local zone session is based on several values, namely the values A, Q, a test message and a default master key, that are initially loaded into both the security module 24 and the PINpad 38A (steps 400 and 402). The values A and Q are large prime numbers. None of these values need to be stored on a secure basis, since even knowledge of all four will not assist an interloper in determining the actual encryption keys which will be used to encrypt the PIN numbers. The security module 24 first selects a large random number R and calculates the value
X=Mod Q (A.sup.R),
where the Mod function returns the integer remainder after long division (step 404). That is X is equal to the remainder when A to the R power is divided by Q. The value of X is then encrypted by the security module 24 using the default master key (step 406). The encrypted value X is then sent to the POS 22, and the POS sends it to the PINpad 38A via the controller 32. The PINpad 38A decrypts X with the default master key (step 408). Then, in step 410, the PINpad 38A selects a random number S and calculates
Y=(A.sup.S) Mod Q,
and
KD=(X.sup.S) Mod Q.

[0035] The PINpad 38A then calculates a Key Exchange Key (KEK) from the value KD (412). This calculation may involve any desired suitable function f( ) so as to produce KEK as a 64 bit DES key. Several methods can be used in f( ), including truncation and exclusive ‘or’ ing parts of KD together.

[0036] The PINpad 38A then encrypts Y with the default key (step 414) and encrypts the test message using the DES algorithm with KEK used as the encryption key (step 416). Both the encrypted Y and the encrypted test message are returned to the POS 22 which in turn sends this data to the security module 24.

[0037] The security module 24 decrypts Y with the default key (step 418) and then, in step 420, calculates
KD=(Y.sup.R) Mod Q.

[0038] The security module 24 then calculates the KEK from the value KD, using the same function f( ) previously used by the PINpad 38A (step 422). Using the value KEK, the security module 24 then decrypts the test message which was encrypted by the PINpad 38A with the KEK (step 424).

[0039] The security module 24 then determines if the test message matches the stored value (step 426). If the test message does not match the stored value, the security module 24 selects a new random number R and calculates a new
X=(A.sup.R) Mod Q
to start the process over again. If the decrypted test message matches the test message stored within the security module 24, then the security module 24 continues with the setup process, because the PINpad 38A and the security module 24 have calculated the same KEK. The KEK values in the PINpad 38A and the security module are equal, not only as confirmed by identity in the test messages, but also because the values of KEK calculated are mathematically equivalent:
((A.sup.R)Mod Q).sup.S Mod Q=(A.sup.R*S)Mod Q=(A.sup.S*R)Mod Q=((A.sup.S)Mod Q).sup.R Mod Q.

[0040] The security module 24 then selects a randomly or pseudo randomly generated working key, WK, (step 428) encrypts it with the KEK (step 430) and sends it to the POS 22 which then sends it to the correct PINpad 38A. The PINpad 38A decrypts the working key with the KEK (step 432). Depending on the desired mode of operation, the PINpad 38A may use WK as an encrypting key in any of various encryption methods (i.e. DES, UKPT, RSA, etc.) whenever a PIN number is to be encrypted (steps 434 and 436)).

[0041] As long as the PINpad 38A and security module 24 retain the KEK, it is not changed, but the encryption (working) keys between the security module 24 and the PINpad 38A may be changed regularly in response to specific system events or on a timed basis. The KEK's may change for various reasons: cold starting a dispenser (clearing all of its memory data storage); replacing the PINpad 38A or the security module 24; or replacing the hardware or software of the POS 22.

[0042] The generation of the KEK's may also be accomplished by algorithms other than exponential key exchange.

[0043] Again referring back to FIG. 2, to further ensure the security of PINs entered via the PINpads 38A and 38B, the controller 32 logically controls the operation of the displays 40A and 40B. More specifically, the controller 32 logically controls what can be displayed on the displays 40A and 40B and when text or graphics can be displayed. In one embodiment, the controller 32 controls the displays 40A and 40B such that only predefined text or graphics can be displayed on the displays 40A and 40B when the corresponding PINpad 38A or 38B is operating in an unsecure mode. The PINpads 38A and 38B may operate in an unsecure mode such that a customer can enter alphanumeric information other than a PIN into the PINpads 38A and 38B. When the PINpad 38A or 38B is in the unsecure mode, the alphanumeric information entered is not encrypted such that the controller 32 can use the information. In order to prevent a situation where a customer is tricked into entering his PIN when the PINpad 38A or 38B is in the unsecure mode, the controller 32 controls the corresponding display 40A or 40B such that only predefined messages can be displayed.

[0044] In one embodiment, the card readers 36A and 36B, the PINpads 38A and 38B, and the displays 40A and 40B are modular components. Thus, unlike the SST 10 of FIG. 1, any of the card readers 36A and 36B, the PINpads 38A and 38B, and the displays 40A and 40B can be replaced without replacing all of the components, thereby substantially decreasing expense when there is a failure in one of the card readers 36A and 36B, the PINpads 38A and 38B, or the displays 40A and 40B. In another embodiment, all of the components 34-54 are modular components.

[0045] It should also be noted that the card readers 36A and 36B, the PINpads 38A and 38B, and security module 24 are tamper-evident components. Further, the security module 24 may comprise a tamper-proof enclosure like the enclosure of the security module disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 5,384,850.

[0046] FIG. 5 illustrates the fueling environment 20′ according to another embodiment of the present invention. In this embodiment, the fueling environment 20′ includes the point-of-sale 22 and the fuel dispensers 26′-30′. However, unlike the embodiment of FIG. 2, this embodiment does not include the security module 24. As illustrated in the fuel dispenser 26′, each of the fuel dispensers 26′-30′ include fuel dispenser electronics 56 and a self-service terminal (SST) 58. The fuel dispenser electronics 56 includes a dispenser controller 60 that controls the printers 34A and 34B, the displays 40A and 40B, the soft keys 42A and 42B, the RFIDs 44A and 44B, the bar code readers 46A and 46B, and the cash acceptors 48A and 48B as commonly known in the art.

[0047] According to the illustrated embodiment of the present invention, each of the fuel dispensers 26′-30′ also includes the SST 58. The SST 58 includes an EMV controller 62 and the card readers 36A and 36B and the PINpads 38A and 38B. The EMV controller 62 includes the SAMs and the bank keys such that the EMV controller 62 operates similarly to the security module 24 of FIG. 2. Accordingly, the EMV controller 62 operates to provide either off-line validation of a customer's PIN using the SAMs or on-line validation of the customer's PIN by encrypting the PIN using a corresponding bank key and communicating the encrypted PIN to a host computer (not shown) via the dispenser controller 60 and the POS 22, which act as gateways. The EMV controller 62 may also communicate with the dispenser controller 60 to logically control the displays 40A and 40B as described above.

[0048] As illustrated in FIG. 6, in operation, assuming a customer is purchasing fuel on the first side of the fuel dispenser 26′, the customer inserts his smart card into the card reader 36A (step 600). The EMV controller 62 communicates with the dispenser controller 60 such that a message is displayed on the display 40A to prompt the customer to enter his PIN (step 602). The customer then enters his PIN using the PINpad 38A (step 604). The PINpad 38A encrypts the PIN (step 604) and communicates the encrypted PIN to the EMV controller 62 (step 608). Once the EMV controller 62 receives the encrypted PIN, it decrypts the PIN (step 610). The EMV then determines whether to perform off-line or on-line validation of the PIN (step 612). For off-line validation, the EMV controller 62 communicates the PIN to the SAMs for validation based on data read from the smart card by the smart card reader 36A (step 614). For on-line validation, after decrypting the PIN, the EMV controller 62 encrypts the PIN using a corresponding one of the stored bank keys (step 616) and communicates the PIN encrypted using the bank key to a host computer (not shown) via the dispenser controller 60 and the POS 22 for on-line validation based on data read from the smart card by the smart card reader 36A (step 618).

[0049] Referring back to FIG. 5, it should be noted that the retail environment 20′ of FIG. 5 requires only one set of SAMs for each of the dispenser 26′-30′ and one set of stored bank keys for each of the dispensers 26′-30′. In this embodiment, the SAMs are either incorporated into or securely interfaced to the EMV controller 62, and the bank keys are stored by the EMV controller 62 or alternatively stored in memory (not shown) securely interfaced to the EMV controller 62. In other words, the retail environment 20′ avoids the need for a different set of SAMs for each of the PINpads 38A and 38B in each of the dispensers 26-30 and also avoids the need for storing the bank keys in each of the PINpads 38A and 38B in each of the dispensers 26-30.

[0050] In one embodiment, communication between the EMV controller 62 and the PINpads 38A and 38B and the card readers 36A and 36B utilize an encryption scheme similar to that disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 5,384,850 and described above. However, this encryption scheme is exemplary and is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention. In general, whenever it is desirable to generate encryption keys, local zone sessions are initiated between the EMV controller and each of the PINpads 38A and 38B and the card readers 36A and 36B. Accordingly, different keys are generated for encrypted communication between the EMV controller 62 and each of the PINpads 38A and 38B and the card readers 36A and 36B. The keys generated during the local zone sessions may be used to encrypt communications using any number of encryption algorithms including, but not limited to, Rivest-Shamir-Adelman algorithm (RSA), the Diffie-Hellman algorithm (DH), the Data Encryption Standard (DES), or one or more of the RSA, DH, and DES algorithms. In one embodiment, the communications may be encrypted using DES using a unique key per transaction (UKPT) or a Master key and a Session key.

[0051] Those skilled in the art will recognize improvements and modifications to the preferred embodiments of the present invention. All such improvements and modifications are considered within the scope of the concepts disclosed herein and the claims that follow.