Methods and apparatus for scalable distributed management of wireless virtual private networks

[0001] This application claims the benefit of U.S. application Ser. No. 09/844,693 filed Apr. 26, 2001 and U.S. provisional application No. 60/384,662 filed on May 31, 2002, incorporated by reference in its entirety.

[0002] The invention was made with Government support under contract Number N66001-00-C-8001 awarded by Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center. The Government has certain rights in this invention.

[0003] The field of the invention is secure groupware management. Also, the field of the invention is lightweight software or middleware for supporting secure group collaboration, fault-tolerance protocols, and cryptographic secret sharing. Moreover, the field of invention may further be described as that of low overhead link-state routing protocols.

[0004] Small wireless handheld devices are becoming ubiquitous. Such devices offer new opportunities for forming lightweight collaborative ad hoc groups without the support of a fixed infrastructure. However, wireless communication is inherently more open to eavesdroppers and intruders than strictly wired networks. Currently, there is no means for secure dynamic group association in wireless multicast groups. Moreover, ad hoc network protocols have not addressed security considerations.

[0005] Any sufficiently complex computer system has vulnerabilities. Such vulnerabilities can be exploited by attackers who will be able to penetrate the system. Approaches such as secure protocols (SSL or Secure Socket Layer) perform only in the client server model and are not applicable to groups.

[0006] One typical approach to security for collaborative groups in networks is to use virtual private networks (VPNs). Such an approach is still difficult to successfully apply to mobile ad hoc networks, as current VPN technology requires fixed infrastructure such as firewalls and gateways.

[0007] Fault-tolerant protocols are known for authentication and key distribution but they rely on several authentication servers, some of which may be compromised. (L. Gong. Increasing Availability and Security of an Authentication Service. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 11(5):657-662, June 1993.) Whereas systems are known that may provide an authentication service to establish a secure point-to-point communications between two, the need for a secure service for a group rather than merely a pair remains a pressing problem to be solved.

[0008] Systems exist capable of providing secure group communication between distributed computers. These infrastructures provide group membership and multitasked services that support a variety of network level faults including network partitioning. Key agreement or key distribution protocols are implemented on top of these services, and cryptography ensures confidentiality and integrity of group communication. However, existing systems typically provide security against attacks on network traffic but do not provide intrusion tolerance. Moreover, these services have not yet been extended into a wireless network.

[0009] What is needed is an architecture that provides secure services in wireless networks. What is also needed is the essence of a VPN in a wireless network. Moreover, such a VPN is needed in mobile ad hoc networks. And such a secure communication system should tolerate some degree of intrusion while maintaining network stability.

[0010] The invention is directed towards systems and methods for managing secure collaborative network groups. The invention provides secure wireless virtual private networks. Further, the invention provides dynamic secure group management in wireless VPN. Also provided is a secure network communication method for collaborative networks. The inventive method further provides a means for dynamic creating groups of users and for dynamically managing group membership. The inventive method further provides means for group management, which include authentication of group, access control, and key generation and distribution. The invention also provides a wireless communication system wherein communicating modes are connected in such a manner such that a plurality of leaders share network management functions such that the resulting network communications are secure from unauthorized access.

[0011] Moreover invention provides a method of group authentication in collaborative networks having N leaders, wherein such authentication methods includes the steps of requesting session keys from the leader, response of the leader to the requesting member wherein said response includes a session key generated by the leader, and the result being that a secure channel is established between the leader and the requesting member for that session.

[0012] The invention provides operability on top of TBRPF routing protocol so as to support a secure collaborative group application in mobile ad hoc networks. The wireless Enclaves has a multi-leader architecture, where each leader runs on a wireless device. Other nodes (that are also wireless devices) can join a group by contacting and being authenticated by the leaders. Once in a group, each node communicates via multicast with all the other members of the group. The group communication is encrypted by a common group key that is generated and distributed by the leaders, and refreshed whenever the group composition changes. The leaders also distribute information about the current group membership, whenever a node joins or leaves the group; thus every member always knows the identity of the other members. Security (that is to say proper authentication of group members and confidentiality of communication) is preserved even if some of the leaders fail or are compromised. This is achieved via the use of Byzantine fault tolerant protocols and cryptographic secret sharing. The system can tolerate communication failure to some extent as a member does not need to keep in contact with all the leaders at all times.

[0013] Communication between group members as well as between members and leaders rely on TCP/IP protocols. Although other protocols may be used, TBRPF provides the necessary wireless routing and multicast protocols with the very low overhead ideal for mobile ad hoc networks.

[0020] For a brief illustration of TBRPF as it relates to this invention, please refer to Appendix A, and FIGS. 4 through E.

Enclaves^SM1 Services ¹Enclaves is used by Assignee, SRI, International to denotes proprietary software as described herein and set forth in

[0021] A group-oriented application enables users to share information and collaborate via a communication network such as the Internet. Enclaves^SM is a lightweight software infrastructure that provides security services for such applications. See Li Gong Enclaves: Enabling Secure Collaboration over the Internet; IEEE Journal in Selected Areas on Communications; 11, (5): 657-663, June 1993. Enclaves^SM provides services for creating and managing groups of users of small to medium sizes, and enables the group members to communicate securely. Access to an active group is restricted to a set of users who must be pre-registered, but the group can be dynamic: authorized users can freely join, leave, and later rejoin an active application.

[0022] The communication service implements a secure multicast channel that ensures integrity and confidentiality of group communication. All messages originating from a group member are encrypted and delivered to all the other members of the group. For efficiency reasons, Enclaves^SM provides best-effort multicast and does not guarantee that messages will be received, or received in the same order, by all members. This is consistent with the goal of supporting collaboration between human users, which does not require the same reliability guarantees as distributing data between servers or computers.

[0023] The group-management services perform user authentication, access control, and related functions such as key generation and distribution. All group members receive a common group key that is used for encrypting group communication. A new group key is generated and distributed every time the group composition changes, that is, whenever a user enters or leaves the group. Optionally, the group key can also be refreshed on a periodic basis. Enclaves also communicates membership information to all group members. On joining the group, a member is notified of the current group composition. Once in the group, each member is notified when a new user enters or a member leaves the group. Thus, all members know who is in possession of the current group key.

[0024] In summary, Enclaves enables users to be authenticated and to join a groupware application. Once in a group, a user A is presented with a group view, that is, the list of all the other group members. The system is intended to satisfy the following security requirements:

[0025] a) Proper authentication and access control: Only authorized users can join the application and an authorized user cannot be prevented from joining the application.

[0026] b) Confidentiality of group communication: Messages from a member A can be read only by the users who were in A's view of the group at the time the message was sent.

• • [0027] c) Integrity of group communication: A group message received by A was sent by a member of A's current view, was not corrupted in transit, and is not a duplicate. FIGS. 4, A through E inclusive, depict TBRPF and the original Enclaves. FIGS. 5 and 6 depict the conceptual layers of a network system according to the present invention. The invention couples wireless protocol expertise (eg.TBRPF) and authentication protocols and key management.
    Centralized Architecture

[0028] The original version of Enclaves relies on the centralized architecture shown in FIG. 1. In this architecture, a single group leader is responsible for all group-management activities. The leader is in charge of authenticating and accepting new group members, generating group keys and distributing them to members, and distributing group membership information.

Multi Leader Architecture

[0029] The architecture of the wireless version of Enclaves is shown in FIG. 2. The group and key management functions are distributed across n leaders. The leaders 2-10 communicate with each other and with users via an asynchronous network. Messages sent on this network are assumed to be eventually received, but no assumptions are made on the transmission delays and on the order of reception of messages.

[0030] Mobile networks require rapid group association and key deployment. As in previous Enclaves implementations, a common group key is shared by the group members. A new key is generated by the leaders whenever the group changes.

[0031] In its dynamic wireless form provided by the invention taught herein, Enclaves can provide a VPN for wireless networks because it removes prespecified leaders and preregistered users. It decentralizes authentication and join protocols. The authentication is based on certificates and public key cryptography. And the key management protocols are new.

[0032] The VPN component is achieved through leveraging VPN technology to create portable, secure, intrusion tolerant, lightweight software infrastructure. Such an infrastructure is based upon fault-tolerant algorithms and cryptography. Groups are managed by predefined sets of leaders.

[0033] The dynamic aspect is accomplished by removing the requirement of predefined leaders so that the network is dynamically reconfigurable for increased security and intrusion tolerance. The deployment on ad-hoc wireless networks increases the dynamic character. Organizing groups in clusters serves to further compartmentalize communication and also conserves bandwidth.

[0034] Wireless Enclaves also includes protocols for robust and secure multicast.

[0035] The preferred embodiment also includes support for multiple secure groups. Authentication, key management and multicast require collaboration of nodes from different groups. Moreover, group hierarchy and clustering is achieved through communication filtering, adapting organization to dynamic network environment, and changing cluster to reduce communication cost.

[0036] Scalability of dynamic enclaves is demonstrable in the protocols set forth and otherwise described herein.

[0037] The architecture is designed to tolerate up to f compromised leaders, where 3f+1≦n.

[0038] The security requirements are the same as previously, and assume that a fixed list of authorized participants is specified before an application starts. The new objective is now to ensure that these requirements are satisfied even if up to f leaders are compromised.

[0039] For proper group management, any modification of the group composition requires agreement between the nonfaulty leaders. These leaders must agree before accepting a new member or determining that an existing member has left. Ideally, one would like all nonfaulty leaders to maintain agreement on the group composition. Unfortunately, this requires solving a consensus problem, in an asynchronous network, under Byzantine faults. As is well known, there are no deterministic algorithms for solving this problem. Randomized algorithms or algorithms relying on failure detectors could be applicable, but these algorithms tend to be complex and expensive. Instead, a weaker form of consistency property is sufficient for satisfying Enclave's security requirements. The algorithm used in this embodiment is similar to consistent broadcast protocols. Combined with an appropriate authentication procedure, this algorithm ensures that any authorized user who requests to join the group will eventually be accepted. Unlike Byzantine agreement, this algorithm does not guarantee that users are accepted in the same order by all leaders. However, this does not lead to a violation of the confidentiality or integrity properties. If the group becomes stable, all non-faulty leaders eventually reach a consistent view of the group.

[0040] As in previous Enclaves implementations, a common group key is shared by the group members. A new key is generated by the leaders whenever the group changes. The difficulty is to generate and distribute this key in an intrusion-tolerant fashion. All group members must obtain the same valid group key, despite the presence of faulty leaders. The attacker must not be able to obtain the group key even with the help of f faulty leaders. These two requirements are satisfied by using a secret sharing scheme proposed by Cachin et al. In the Enclaves framework, this scheme is used by leaders to independently generate and send individual shares of the group key to group members. The protocol is configured so that f+1 shares are necessary for reconstructing the key. A share is accompanied with a description of the group to which it corresponds and a “proof of correctness” that is computationally hard to counterfeit. This allows group members to obtain strong evidence that a share is valid, and prevents faulty leaders from disrupting group communication by sending invalid shares.

[0041] To join an application, a user A must contact 2f+1 leaders. Once in the group, A remains connected to these leaders and receives key and group update messages from them. A majority of consistent messages (i.e., f+1) must be received before A takes any action. For example, A changes its current group key only after receiving at least f+1 valid key shares from distinct leaders, and checking that these shares correspond to the same group description. This ensures A that the new group key is valid and that at least one share came from a nonfaulty leader.

[0042] Intrusion tolerance in Enclaves relies then on the combination of a cryptographic authentication protocol, a Byzantine fault-tolerant leader-coordination algorithm, and a secret sharing scheme. These protocols are presented in greater detail in the section that follows.

Preferred Embodiment

[0043] Enclaves according to the invention taught herein—that can provide secure dynamic multicast groups on mobile wireless networks—is currently implemented in Java, using Sun Microsystems' Java 2 SDK 1.3.1 and the Cryptix 3.2 cryptographic libraries. (See http://www.cryptix.org) The source consists of around 9,000 lines of code in approximately 100 classes.

[0044] The software is organized in two main modules as depicted in FIG. 3. A set of classes implements the core Enclaves functionalities, namely, the authentication 3-, group management, and key-management functions described previously. On top of this basis, a user interface 3-12 is available that can be customized to support diverse applications. The interface allows users to authenticate and log in to an Enclaves group and displays status information, including the list of members. Applications can be easily incorporated into this interface via a “plugin” mechanism 3-14.

Core Enclaves

[0045] The core classes implement the protocols and algorithms described previously. These classes are organized in an Enclaves layer responsible for authentication and group management services, a cryptographic module, and a communication layer that interface with Java networking functions. In a current embodiment, group communication (between group members) as well as communication between leaders is implemented using IP multicast. Leader-to-client connections rely on TCP.

[0046] The preferred embodiment of Enclaves uses Cryptix 3.2 as a cryptographic module, but other providers complying with the Java Security Architecture can be used. Enclaves uses a symmetric-key encryption algorithm (currently triple DES), a digital signature algorithm (DSA), and secure hashing algorithm (SHA). These can be easily replaced by other algorithms with similar functionality.

Plugins

[0047] Enclaves provides a simple user interface that can be customized for various applications via the use of “plugins”. The plugins are loaded on startup and executed as the user requires. This architecture allows several applications to coexist and run concurrently in the same Enclaves group. The underlying support classes transparently encrypt all application messages and distribute them to all group members. Conversely, messages received from the group are decrypted and dispatched to the relevant plugin.

Protocols

[0048] The protocols currently used in the preferred embodiment are set forth. While there is a strong emphasis on intrusion tolerance as a feature, notwithstanding, the characteristics of the preferred embodiment should not be interpreted as limitations on the invention as taught herein.

Authentication

[0049] To join the group, a user A must first initiate an authentication protocol with 2f+1 distinct leaders. A is accepted as a new group member if it is correctly authenticated by at least f+1 leaders. This ensures that f faulty leaders cannot prevent an honest user from joining the group, and conversely that f faulty leaders cannot allow an unauthorized user to join the group.

[0050] For authentication purposes, all users registered as authorized participants in an application share a long-term secret key with each leader. If L_ι is one of the leaders, A has a long-term key P_α,i that is known by L_ι and A. In the current implementation, P_α,ι is computed from A and L_ι's identities, and A's password by applying a one-way hash function. This ensures with high probability that two distinct leaders L_ι and L_j do not have the same key for A. Intrusion at a leader L_ι can reveal key P_α,i to the attacker but does not reveal A's password or P_αj. Thus, access to up to f long-term keys P_α,ι does not enable an attacker to impersonate A.

[0051] The following protocol is used by A to authenticate with L_ι

[0052] 1. A→L_i: AuthInitReq, A, L_ι, {A, L_i, N₁}P_α,i,

[0053] 2. L_ι→A: AuthKeyDist, L_i, A,

• • [0054] {L_i, A, N¹, N₂, Ka,i}P_α,i

[0055] 3. A→L₁: AuthAckKey, A, L_ι, {N₂, N₃}K_α,ι

[0056] As a result of this exchange, A is in possession of a session key K_α,i that has been generated by L_i. All group management messages from L_ι to A are encrypted with K_α,i. Thus, a secure channel is set up between A and L_i that ensures confidentiality and integrity of all group-management messages from L_ι, to A. Nonces and acknowledgments protect against replay. The key K_α,i is in use until A leaves the group. A fresh session key will be generated if A later rejoins the group.

Leader Coordination

[0057] If a non-faulty leader L_ι successfully authenticates A, L_ι does not immediately add A as a new group member. Instead, the leader coordination algorithm described in FIG. 3 is executed. A similar algorithm is used to coordinate leaders when a member leaves the group.

• • [0058] Leader L_ι runs the following protocol
  • [0059] After successful authentication of A,
  • [0060] L_i sends (Propose,j, A, n_j)_σj to all leaders
  • [0061] After receiving f+1 valid (Propose, j, A, n_j)_σj from different leaders, L_i sends (Propose, i, A, ni)_σ,1 to all leaders if it has not already done so When Li receives n−f valid (Propose, j, A, n_j)_σj from n−f distinct leaders, L_ι accepts A as a new member
    Leader Coordination Protocol

[0062] The notation ( . . . )_σι denotes a message digitally signed by L_i. The constant n_ι is used to protect against replay attacks. Each leader maintains a local integer variable n_i and its local view M_i of the current group members. M_i is updated and n_i is incremented every time L_ι accepts a new member or removes an existing member. The message (Propose, A, n_j), is considered valid by L_i if the signature checks, if n_j≧n_i, and if A is not a member of M_i. The pair (n_ι, M_ι) is L_ι's current view of the group. In FIG. 3, L_ιmust include its own (Propose . . . ) message among the n−f messages necessary before accepting A.

[0063] This algorithm is a variant of existing consistent broadcast algorithms. It satisfies the following properties as long as no more than f leaders are faulty:

• • [0064] Consistency: If one non-faulty leader accepts A then all non-faulty leaders eventually accept A.
  • [0065] Liveness: If f+1 non-faulty leaders announce A, then A is eventually accepted by all non-faulty leaders.
  • [0066] Valid Authentication: If one non-faulty leader accepts A then A has been announced, and thus authenticated, by at least one non-faulty leader.

[0067] The last property prevents the attacker from introducing unauthorized users into the group. Conversely, if A is an authorized user and correctly executes the authentication protocol, A will be announced by f+1 non-faulty leaders, and thus will eventually be accepted as a new member by all non-faulty leaders.

[0068] The protocol works in an asynchronous network model where transmission delays are unbounded. It does not ensure that all non-faulty leaders always have a consistent group view. Two leaders L_i and L_j may have different sets M_i and M_j for the same view number n_ι=n_j. This happens if several users join or leave the group concurrently, and their requests and the associated Propose messages are received in different orders by L_ι and L_j. If the group becomes stable, that is, no requests for join or leave are generated in a long interval, then all non-faulty leaders eventually converge to a consistent view. They communicate this view and the associated group-key shares to all their clients who all also eventually have a consistent view of the group and the same group key.

[0069] Temporary disagreement on the group view may cause non-faulty leaders to send valid but inconsistent group-key shares to some members. This does not compromise the security requirements of Enclaves but may delay the distribution of a new group key.

Group-Key Management

[0070] The group-key management protocol relies on secure secret sharing. Each of the n leaders knows only a share of the group key, and at least f+1 shares are required to reconstruct the key. Any set of no more than f shares is insufficient. This ensures that compromise of at most f leaders does not reveal the group key to the attacker. In most secret sharing schemes, n shares s_i, . . . , s_n, are computed from a secret s and distributed to n shareholders. The shares are computed by a trusted dealer who needs to know s. In Enclaves, a new secret s and new shares must be generated whenever the group changes. This must be done online and without a dealer, to avoid a single point of failure. A further difficulty is that some of the parties involved in the share renewal process may be compromised.

[0071] A solution to these problems was devised by Cachin et al. In their protocol, the n shareholders can individually compute their share of a common secret s without knowing or learning s. One can compute s from any set of f+1 or more such shares, but f shares or fewer are not sufficient. The shares are all computed from a common value {hacek over (g)} that all shareholders know. In the preferred embodiment context, the shareholders are the group leaders and {hacek over (g)} is derived from the group view using a one-way hash function. Leader L_i computes its share s_ι using a share-generation function S, the value j, and a secret x_i that only L_i knows: s_i=S({hacek over (g)}, x_i). Leader L_i also gives a proof that s₁ is a valid share for {hacek over (g)}. This proof does not reveal information about x₁ but enables group members to check that s_ι is valid.

[0072] The secrecy properties of the protocol rely on the difficulty in computing discrete logarithms in a group of large prime order. Such a group G can be constructed by selecting two large prime numbers p and q such that p=2q+1 and defining G as the unique subgroup of order q in Z*_p. The dealer chooses a generator g of G and performs the following operations:

• • [0073] Select randomly f+1 elements α_o, . . . , α_f of Z_q.
  • [0074] These coefficients define a polynomial of degree f in Z_q [X]:
    F=α_o+α1,X+, . . . +α_fX^f.
  • [0075] Compute x₁, . . . x_n, of Z_q, and g₁, g_n, of G as follows:
    x_i=F(i)
    g_i=g^xi.

[0076] The numbers x₁, . . . , x_n, must then be distributed secretly to the n leaders L₁, . . . , L_n, respectively. The generator g and the elements g_j, . . . , g_n. are made public. They must be known by all users and leaders.

[0077] Any subset of f+1 values among x₁, . . . , x_n. allows one to reconstruct F by interpolation, and then to compute the value α_o=F(0). For example, given x₁, . . . , X_f+1, one has

[0078] $a_o=\sum _{i=1}^{f+1}{b}_i{x}_i,$
where b_ι is obtained from j=1, . . . , f+1 by

[0079] $b_i=\frac{\prod _{j\ne i}^{}j}{\prod _{j\ne i}^{}\left(j-i\right)}.$

[0080] By this interpolation method, one can compute {hacek over (g)}^αo for any {hacek over (g)}ε G given any subset of f+1 values among {hacek over (g)}^x1 . . . {hacek over (g)}^xn. For example, from {hacek over (g)}^x1, . . . , {hacek over (g)}^f+1, one gets

[0081] ${\stackrel{⋓}{g}}^{\mathrm{ao}}=\prod _{i=1}^{\underset{\_}{f+1}}\left({\left(\tilde{g}\right)}^{x_i}\right)b_i$

[0082] As discussed previously, leader L_ι maintains a local group view (n_ι, M_j). L_i's share s_i is a function of the group view, the generator g, and L_i's secret value x_i. L_i first computes {hacek over (g)}ε G using a one-way hash function HI:
{hacek over (g)}=H₁, (n_i, M_i).
The share s_iis then defined as
s_i={hacek over (g)}^xi.
The group key for the view (n_i, M_i) is defined as
K=H₂({hacek over (g)}^αo),
where H₂ is another hash function from G to {0, 1}^k (k is the key length). Using equation (1), a group member can compute {hacek over (g)}^αo given any subset of f+1 or more shares for the same group view. Under a standard intractability assumption, it is computationally infeasible to compute K knowing fewer than f+1 shares. It is also infeasible for an adversary to predict the values of future group keys K even if the adversary corrupts f leaders and has access to f secret values among x₁, . . . X_n.

[0083] Equation (1) allows a group member to compute {hacek over (g)}^αo and K from f+1 valid shares of the form s_ι={hacek over (g)}^xi. However, a compromised leader L_ι could make the computation fail by sending an invalid share s_I≠{hacek over (g)}^xι. L_ι could also cause different members to compute different K's by sending different shares to each. To protect against such attacks, the share s_i is accompanied with a proof of validity. This extra information enables a member to check that s_ι is equal to {hacek over (g)}^xi with very high probability. The verification uses the public value g₁ that is known to be equal to g^x1 (since the dealer is trusted). To prove validity without revealing x₁, leader L_i generates evidence that
log_{{hacek over (g)}}s₁=log_gg_i.

[0084] To generate the evidence, L_ι randomly chooses a number y in Z_q and computes
u=g^y
v={hacek over (g)}^y

[0085] Then L_ι uses a third hash function H₃ from G⁶ to Z_q, to compute
C=H₃(g, g_i, u,{hacek over (g)}, s_i, v)
z=y +x_ic.

[0086] The proof that s₁ is a valid share for {hacek over (g)} the pair (c, z). The information sent by L_ι to a group member A is then the tuple
(n_i,M₁,s_i,c,z).

[0087] This message is sent via the secure channel established between A and L_i after authentication. This prevents an attacker in control of f leaders from obtaining extra shares by eavesdropping on communications between leaders and clients.

[0088] On receiving the above message, a group member A evaluates {hacek over (g)}=H₁, (n_ι, M_ι) and
u¹=g^z/g^c,
v¹={hacek over (g)}^z/s^c_i.
A accepts the share as valid if the following equation holds:
c=H₃(g,g_i,u¹,{hacek over (g)}s_ι,v¹)−

[0089] If this check fails, s_ι is not a valid share and A ignores it. Once A receives f+1 valid shares corresponding to the same group view, A can construct the group key. Since A maintains a connection with at least f+1 honest leaders, A eventually receives at least f+1 valid shares for the same view, once the group becomes stable.

[0090] It has been proven computationally infeasible, in the random oracle model, for a compromised leader L_i to produce an invalid share s' and two values c and z that pass the share-verification check.

Cryptographic Material

[0091] The following cryptographic keys and secret material must be distributed to the leaders and registered users:

[0092] Each leader L_ι must own a private key to sign messages when executing the leader-coordination protocol. The corresponding public key must be known by all the other leaders.

[0093] L_i must also hold the secret xi used to generate shares of group keys. The corresponding verification key gi must be known by all the registered users.

[0094] For every registered user A and leader L_i, a secret longterm key P_α,ι is shared by A and L_i. This key is used for authentication.

[0095] Communication between an application and the underlying Enclaves layer must follow the interface described hereinabove. A plugin simply needs to implement the three methods of abstract class PlugIn Method buildGUI

public abstract class PlugIn

[0096] extends Jframe implements . . . {

• • [0097] protected abstract void buildGUI();
  • [0098] protected abstract void receiveMessage(Message m);
  • [0099] protected abstracted void sendMessage (byte[]msg);
    is invoked by the user interface for the application to initialize. Afterwards, communication between the application and the Enclaves middleware is performed via two methods for sending and receiving messages. When a plugin is ready to be deployed, the developer must package it and every resource it needs into a JAR file and put it in a specific directory. The new plugin is then loaded and available to users.

[0100] Currently, four basic plugins have been developed for Enclaves: a shared whiteboard application (Paint), a messaging application allowing users to send text messages (Chat), a file transfer application for multicasting data files (FTP plugin), and a Sound plugin for multicast of streaming audio. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the potential for plugins is not intended to be limited by the illustrations provided herein.

Performance

[0101] Enclaves's security requirements can be shown to theoretically hold if no more than f leaders are compromised, no group member is compromised, the attacker does not break the cryptographic algorithms, and the network assumptions are satisfied. The cryptographic and secret sharing protocols used are hard to break. If weaknesses are discovered, the Enclaves implementation makes it easy to change cryptographic primitives.

[0102] As in any group-communication system, if an attacker can compromise a member machine and get hold of the group key, or if one member is non-trustworthy, then confidentiality is lost. Clearly, there is no absolute defense against this vulnerability as it is the function of the system to distribute data to all group members. Mitigating measures could be implemented, such as requiring members to periodically re-authenticate before sending them a new key, or relying on intrusion detection and expel members suspected of being compromised.

[0103] Current TCP/IP protocols make it difficult to defend against network-based denial-of-service attacks based on flooding in any system. However, the distributed architecture of Enclaves increases the resilience of the system to such attacks. A useful property is also that group communication can continue even after a successful denial-of-service attack on the leaders. Such an attack prevents new users from joining an application and the group key from being refreshed but does not immediately affect the users already in the group.

[0104] Clearly, the architecture of Enclaves improves group security only if it is substantially harder for an attacker to penetrate several leaders than a single one. Every attempt should then be made to prevent common vulnerabilities, so that the same attack does not succeed on all leaders. This requires diversity. Leaders should use different hardware and operating systems, and, as a minimum, different implementations of the Java Virtual Machine. It is also desirable to put the different leaders under the responsibility of different administrators, as a protection against the insider threat.

[0105] This invention as described in the specification, drawings and claims is intended to cover all embodiments and equivalence's that occur to a computer science practitioner or those of skill in related fields.