Method and System for Providing Secure EDI Over an Open Network

The present invention relates to methods and systems for providing secure EDI over an open system network, such as the INTERNET, and particularly to an improved method and system for providing a secure EDI mailer over an open network which employs an RSA type public/private key encryption scheme in order to deliver secure authentication, and non-repudiation of both origin and receipt.

Public/private key secure communication systems over an open network are well known, such as described in U.S. Pat. Nos. 4,578,531; 4,471,164; 5,268,962; 5,142,577; 4,893,338; 5,222,140; 5,261,002; 5,073,934; 5,303,303; 5,297,208; 5,369,705; 5,351,293; 5,375,169; 5,224,166; 5,253,294; and 5,237,611. The RSA public/private key encryption scheme, is a well-known public key system for providing secure messages over an open network, such as the INTERNET, and is described in various issued United States patents, such as U.S. Pat. Nos. 4,405,829; 4,424,414; 4,200,770; 4,218,582; 5,073,935; and 4,723,284, the contents of which are incorporated by reference herein. In addition, the concept of non-repudiation of origin is known, such as described in U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,226,709; and 5,367,573; as well as such systems in which digital signatures are employed in public/private key systems, such as described in U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,311,591; 5,214,702; 5,337,360; 4,868,877; 5,001,752; 5,005,200; 5,136,643; 5,018,196; 4,885,777; 4,267,782; 5,351,302; 5,208,858; 5,299,263; 5,142,578; 4,987,593; 4,991,210; 5,339,361; 5,373,558; 4,625,076; and the Entrust system marketed by Northern Telecom. Furthermore, various other secure transmission systems have been developed over the years in an attempt to try to provide secure business communications over public or private networks, such as described in U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,369,702; 4,876,716; 5,199,074; 4,823,388; 5,268,962; 5,022,080; 5,136,646; and 5,204,961. Also, the use of electronic data or document interchange or EDI to transmit business communications from peer to peer is known in the art, such as described, by way of example, in U.S. Pat. No. 5,202,977 owned by the assignee herein, or in previously mentioned U.S. Pat. No. 5,337,360. However, applicants are not aware of any successful prior art attempts to use the INTERNET, or any other widely accessible open network, such as telephone lines or any TCP/IP system, in which a secure public key/private key system, such as RSA, has been successfully combined with EDI to provide authentication and non-repudiation of both origin and receipt in a secure peer-to-peer private transaction which can occur at any time over the open network without requiring password management, while also providing verification of message integrity. Such a system eliminates the need for private valve-added networks and other third party private networks as well as ensuring the commercial feasibility of a private peer-to-peer business transaction over a widely available open network using EDI. The certainty of non-repudiation and authentication eliminates the ability of either party to deny that the transaction was approved and eliminates doubt as to the contents of the EDI document giving rise to the transaction. The ability of the method and system of the present invention to provide a secure EDI mailer in combination with an RSA type public/private key system overcomes the disadvantages of the prior art.

The method and system of the present invention comprises using the AUTACK or EDI acknowledgement message as a document to provide the digital signature in a public/private key system in which the AUTACK is signed by an encrypted hash code from the EDI interchange communication which has been encrypted with the sender's private key, such as in an RSA type public/private key system, and is an improvement on such systems. Because the AUTACK or functional acknowledgement is sealed with the private key of the sender of the functional acknowledgement, the recipient of the original message, when the original sender decrypts the reply AUTACK message with the recipient's public key, he is assured that the intended recipient actually sent the reply AUTACK or acknowledgement and of the integrity of the receipt due to the correct hash code being detected.

The EDI AUTACK message, such as the EDIFACT AUTACK message, a generic international standard of EDI for administration, commerce and trade, is preferably used to deliver the desired secure authentication, non-repudiation of origin or receipt, and acknowledgement or denial of acknowledgement for one or more EDI envelopes, such as the X.12 or EDIFACT envelopes, by way of example. In the presently preferred method and system of the present invention, in the process of authentication and non-repudiation of origin, the sender computes a desired hush or message digest from the EDI, such as the MD5 for the entire EDI interchange communication, and inserts the value in the AUTACK message. The sender then preferably computes the MD5 (message digest version 5) of the AUTACK message and digitally signs the AUTACK by encrypting the computed MD5 with the sender's private key, and inserts this value in the AUTACK message. Thus, the AUTACK, or EDI acknowledgement message, is preferably used to provide the signature. The recipient, after receipt of the message, then decrypts the EDI interchange communication, if it is encrypted, and computer the MD5 of the received EDI interchange communication. If non-repudiation of origin is desired, the recipient then decrypts the AUTACK message with the sender' public key. The value obtained by this decryption in this example is the MD5 of the AUTACK message. The MD5 of the AUTACK message is then computed and compared with the decrypted value. If both values are equal, the integrity of the AUTACK is verified and non-repudiation of origin is established. The MD5 of the EDI interchange communication is then compared with the MD5 of the EDI interchange which had been inserted in the AUTACK and if the two are equal, then the integrity of the EDI interchange is verified, and non-repudiation of origin is established.

In order to then establish non-repudiation of receipt, after verifying the integrity and authenticity of the EDI interchange communication received in the manner described above, a new or reply AUTACK is created by populating all segments and elements as appropriate, the computed MD5 is digitally signed with the receiver's private key, the digitally signed MD5 is inserted into the reply AUTACK, appropriate segments of the reply AUTACK are populated, and the prepared reply AUTACK is transmitted to the sender. The original sender, upon receiving this reply AUTACK, then verifies the digital signature from the recipient of his original message by decrypting it with the receiver's public key. The value obtained by this decryption is the MD5 of the received reply AUTACK. The original sender, who has received the reply AUTACK from the recipient of his message, then computes the MD5 of the received reply AUTACK and if the computed MD5 is equal to the decrypted MD5, the integrity of the AUTACK is preserved and non-repudiation of origin of the AUTACK is established. Moreover, if the MD5 contained in the particular segment of the AUTACK received where it has been inserted by the sender is equal to the MD5 of the EDI interchange previously transmitted and the acknowledgement is positive, which can be inferred by testing the security code in the AUTACK message, then the following are implicit to establish non-repudiation of receipt: the EDI interchange communication in question is known to both sender and receiver because the MD5 of the EDI interchange communication and the interchange number are contained in the AUTACK message and have been duly recognized, the integrity and authenticity of the EDI interchange communication upon receipt has been verified, and the receiver does not deny having received the EDI interchange communication in question.

The ability to trade or conduct business on a peer-to-peer basis over an open public network, such as the INTERNET, without the need for password management may be controlled, to the extent desired, by the trading participants through the use of trading partner agreements to provide key exchange certification, or by reliance on a certificate authority which issues and verifies public/private key paths. Thus, private and secure transactions, subject to authentication and non-repudiation of both origin and receipt, along with verification of message integrity, using EDI, may be conducted over an open communication network.

FIG. 1 is a functional flow diagram of the presently preferred method and system of the present invention for providing secure EDI over an open network, such as the INTERNET, in order to provide, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation of origin and recipient, and confidentiality using EDI;

FIG. 2 is a functional flow diagram of the portion of the method and system of FIG. 1 which provides authentication and non-repudiation of origin using the EDIFACT AUTACK message;

FIG. 3 is a functional flow diagram, similar to FIG. 2, of the portion of the method and system of FIG. 1 which provides non-repudiation of recipient using the EDIFACT AUTACK message;

FIG. 4 is a functional flow diagram of the receipt of secure mail over the INTERNET in accordance with the presently preferred method and system of the present invention;

FIG. 5 is a functional flow diagram, similar to FIG. 4, of the sending of secure mail over the INTERNET in accordance with the presently preferred method and system of the present invention;

FIG. 6 is a functional flow diagram, similar to FIG. 4, of trading partner management in accordance with the presently preferred method and system of the present invention;

FIG. 7 is a functional flow diagram, similar to FIG. 4, of audit log management in accordance with the presently preferred method and system of the present invention;

FIG. 8 is a functional flow diagram, similar to FIG. 4, of tracking management in accordance with the presently preferred method and system of the present invention;

FIG. 9 is a functional flow diagram, similar to FIG. 4, of job monitoring in accordance with the presently preferred method and system of the present invention;

FIG. 10 is a functional diagram of the organization of the system employed in carrying out the presently preferred method of the present invention;

FIGS. 11A, 11B, 12, 13A, and 13B comprise a functional flow diagram, similar to FIG. 4, of the overall presently preferred method and system of FIGS. 1-10, with FIG. 11 illustrating certificate verification, FIG. 12 illustrating TPA processing, and FIG. 13 illustrating public key/private key processing;

FIG. 14 is a diagrammatic illustration of a typical computer screen display in accordance with the presently preferred method and system of the present invention, illustrating the various functional options to be controlled by the users to ensure secure mail over the INTERNET in accordance with the presently preferred method and system of the present invention.

FIGS. 15-21 are diagrammatic illustrations, similar to FIG. 14, of typical computer screen displays in accordance with the TRADING PARTNERS PROFILE option in the screen display of FIG. 14;

FIGS. 22-28 are diagrammatic illustrations, similar to FIG. 14, of typical computer screen displays in accordance with the TRADING PARTNER AGREEMENTS option in the screen display of FIG. 14, with FIG. 28 illustrating the OUTBOUND RETRANSMISSION screen display for sending secure E-mail in accordance with the presently preferred method and system of the present invention;

FIGS. 29-33 are diagrammatic illustrations, similar to FIG. 14, of typical computer screen displays in accordance with the KEY MANAGEMENT option in the screen display of FIG. 14; and

FIGS. 34-41 are diagrammatic illustrations, similar to FIG. 14, of typical computer screen displays in accordance with the TRACKING option in the screen display of FIG. 14, with FIGS. 35-38 illustrating tracking interchanges and FIGS. 39-41 illustrating tracking an audit log.

Referring now to the drawings in detail, and initially to FIG. 1, a functional flow diagram of the presently preferred system 100 of the present invention for providing secure EDI over a conventional open network, such as the commercially available INTERNET 102, is shown. The preferred method and system of the present invention is implemented in a system which is provided under the trademark TEMPLAR owned by the assignee herein. As will be explained in greater detail hereinafter, with reference to FIGS. 2-41, the presently preferred method and system of the present invention provides integrity, authentication, non-repudiation of both origin and receipt, and confidentiality using EDI. This is preferably accomplished by using the AUTACK or EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) acknowledgement message as a document to provide a digital signature in a public/private key system, which is preferably one employing the conventional RSA public/private key encryption scheme, such as the encryption scheme described in U.S. Pat. Nos. 4,405,828; 4,424,414; 4,200,770; and 4,218,582, the contents of which are incorporated by reference herein in their entirety. As will be described in greater detail hereinafter, the AUTACK is preferably sealed or signed with a digital signature which is preferably created by encrypting the MD5 (message digest version 5) of the AUTACK with the originator of the AUTACK's private key, such as the private key of the sender in the preferred process of authentication and non-repudiation of origin illustrated in FIG. 2, or with the private key of the recipient in the preferred process of non-repudiation of receipt illustrated in FIG. 3. The digital signature is then preferably inserted into a predetermined position in the AUTACK and transmitted to the other party to the transaction. Because the AUTACK is sealed with the private key of the sender of the AUTACK, when the receiver of that AUTACK decrypts the AUTACK with the public key of the sender of that AUTACK, he is assured that the intended recipient of his message actually sent that AUTACK, as well as being assured of the integrity of the receipt due to the correct hash code being detected in the manner to be described hereinafter. In accordance with the present invention, the encrypted secret key used to encrypt the message, as well as the message ityself, are contained in the PKCS message.

The MD5 is a conventional value which can be obtained in an EDI message by conventionally hashing a quantity, such as an EDI interchange. There is a very low probability that the MD5 of any two different documents will be the same and, accordingly, the MD5 is preferably used to establish the integrity of EDI interchanges in accordance with the presently preferred method of the present invention.

As is well known by users of EDI, an AUTACK message is an UN/EDIFACT standard for authentication and acknowledgement. In accordance with the presently preferred method and system of the present invention, the AUTACK preferably consists of the USH or security header, USB, USX to identify the message, USY to hold security information on the referred message, USR, and a few other conventional segments normally found in an AUTACK. Preferably, information such as response type, scope of security application, and security function are coded in the USH segment. By way of example, the second element of the USH segment may preferably contain the value 2, or some other designated value, if the AUTACK were to serve as a document verifying non-repudiation of origin with, for example, the fifth field having the value 2, or some other designated value, if an acknowledgement were required. The USX segment preferably contains the interchange number of the EDI interchange in question, thereby linking the referred message to the AUTACK, and the USR segment preferably is a security result holder and contains the digitally signed MD5 of the AUTACK in accordance with the present invention.

As further shown and preferred in FIG. 1, assuming only a two party business transaction between two parties who have entered into a trading partner agreement, each of the parties has a conventional computer workstation 104, 106, such as a RS/6000, HP/9000 and a SOLARIS; a conventional EDI translator 108, 110; a conventional integrated software/hardware server 112, 114, which has been programmed to operate in accordance with the preferred method and system of the present invention, and which includes conventional computer display terminals 116, 118, capable of operating in a Microsoft WINDOWS or UNIX X-WINDOWS type environment, for displaying messages and choices in accordance with the preferred method of the present invention as well as messages and documents transmitted via EDI over the INTERNET network 102 in carrying out the method of the present invention, with the servers 112, 114 being capable of providing the desired authentication, integrity, non-repudiation of origin and receipt, and confidentiality in accordance with the present invention. As shown and preferred, the servers 112, 114 conventionally communicate over the open network, such as the INTERNET 102, through a heterogeneous mail environment 120, 122, such as one employing SMPT/MIME, X400/X435, LOTUS NOTES/cc:MAIL, and/or MICROSOFT MAIL/EXCHANGE. The server 112, 114 are preferably conventional computers, which have been conventionally programmed in C++, to carry out the presently preferred method of the present invention, and are preferably targeted to run on on one of the following UNIX platforms: AIX, HPUX, SUN OS, or SOLARIS.

Enumerated below in TABLE A are the various scripts which may be readily used by a programmer of ordinary skill in the art to create the necessary programming in C++, which is an object oriented programming language, to run on the servers 112, 114 to carry out the presently preferred method of the present invention. As will be noted, the various scripts relate to sending an EDI document, re-sending an EDI document, receiving a valid EDI document, receiving an acknowledgement AUTACK, receiving a trading partner's new public key, distributing your new public key to related trading partners, activating the certificate management main menu, creating your own private/public key pair, changing a certificate (your own public/private key pair), removing your own private/public key pair, copying your own public key to disk file, printing your own public key certificate, saving your own private/public key to disk file, restoring your own private/public key from disk file to replace the existing private/public key, restoring your own private/public key from disk file to a new key, activating the trading partner public key management main menu, adding a trading partner public key, changing the trading trading partner public key, removing the trading partner public key, copying the trading partner public key from disk file to replace the existing trading partner public key, copying the trading partner public key from disk file to a new key.activating the trading partner agreement management main menu, adding trading partner agreement, changing the trading partner agreement, removing the trading partner agreement, copying the trading partner agreement to disk file, copying the trading partner agreement from disk file, MIME packaging (conventional MIME mailer), MIME unpackaging, PKCS packaging (conventional PKCS), PKCS unpackaging, working with the tracking record, monitoring server jobs, receiving an invalid EDI document with an integrity problem, receiving an AUTACK with an integrity problem, receiving unsupported mail, receiving an EDI interchange without AUTACK while non-repudiation of origin is expected, and receiving an unexpected AUTACK.

FIGS. 14-41 illustrate the various screen displays, in a conventional WINDOWS type environment, that are capable of being preferably provided on the typical computer screens 116, 118 associated with the servers 112, 114 in carrying out the above method under control of the program which is based on the scripts of TABLE A. In this regard, FIG. 14 illustrates the overall screen display which is presented to the parties on the network who are eligible to participate in peer to peer, computer to computer, business EDI transactions through the INTERNET. As shown by way of example in FIG. 14, the user may be presented, by way of example, with the choice to select windows for TRADING PARTNER PROFILES, TRADING PARTNER AGREEMENTS, KEY MANAGEMENT, and TRACKING in the conventional WINDOWS environment which is preferably employed.

FIGS. 15-21 illustrate various computer screen displays which the user may be presented with after selecting the TRADING PARTNERS PROFILES window in the screen display of FIG. 14. FIG. 15 represents a scenario of three possible trading partners identified as CISCO, SEARS, and ME, where ME represents the user himself. FIG. 16 illustrates a possible dialog box for creating the trading partner profile directly on the computer screen 116, 118. Similarly, FIG. 17 illustrates a possible dialog box for creating contact information for the trading partner directly on the computer screen 116, 118. FIG. 18 illustrates a possible dialog box for creating EDI qualifier information directly on the computer screen 116, 118. FIG. 19 illustrates a possible dialog box for trading partner bound keys which are displayed and may be changed directly on the computer screen 116, 118, with two options for BIND and UNBIND being shown. FIG. 20 illustrates the computer screen display 116, 118 when the BIND KEYS option has been selected in the display of FIG. 19 in order to bind a particular key to a particular trading partner. FIG. 21 illustrates the computer screen display 116, 118 for KEY ADDENDUM for, by way of example, displaying a formatted certificate which may be bound to the trading partner along with the key.

FIGS. 22-28 illustrate various computer screen displays which the user may be presented with after selecting the TRADING PARTNER AGREEMENTS window in the screen display of FIG. 14. FIG. 22 represents a scenario of the same three trading partners as identified in FIG. 15. FIG. 23 illustrates a dialog box for creating, in the above example, a trading partner agreement between the user ME, which is the local ID, and SEARS, which is the remote ID, directly on the computer screen 116, 118. FIG. 24 illustrates a dialog box for creating the inbound routing instructions for the trading partner agreement directly on the computer screen 116, 118. Similarly, FIGS. 25-27 illustrate various dialog boxes for creating the outbound routing instructions for the trading partner agreement directly on the computer screen 116, 118. FIG. 28 illustrates a dialog box for selecting the outbound retransmission directly on the computer screen 116, 118.

FIGS. 29-33 illustrate various computer screen displays which the user may be presented with after selecting the KEY MANAGEMENT window in the screen display of FIG. 14. FIG. 29 again represents a scenario of the same three trading partners as presented in FIG. 15. FIG. 30 illustrates a possible dialog box associated with the local key ID, FIG. 31 illustrates a possible dialog box associated with the remote key ID, FIG. 32 illustrates a possible dialog box associated with key details, and FIG. 33 illustrates a possible dialog box associated with export of the public key to another file.

FIGS. 34-41 illustrate various computer screen displays which the user may be presented with after selecting the TRACKING window in the screen display of FIG. 14. FIG. 34 illustrates a screen display on the computer screen 116, 118 in which two EDI messages have been sent, one between SEARS and CISCO, and one between ME and THEM, by way of example. FIG. 35 illustrates a possible display on the computer screen 116, 118 of the interchanges between the trading partners and shows the non-repudiation of receipt AUTACK, illustrating the AUTACK status on the computer screen 116, 118 in accordance with the present invention. FIG. 36 illustrates a possible display on the computer screen 116, 118 of the EDI data after the VIEW EDI DATA dialog box has been selected in the screen display of FIG. 35. FIGS. 37-38 illustrate possible screen displays on the computer screen 116, 118 for selecting tracking criteria. FIG. 39 illustrates a possible screen display on the computer screen 116, 118 of an audit log, with FIGS. 40-41 illustrating possible screen displays on the computer screen 116, 118 for selecting audit log selection criteria.

Referring now to FIG. 2, the preferred process of authentication and non-repudiation of origin in accordance with the presently preferred method of the present invention shall now be described. As shown and preferred in FIG. 2, block 200 represents a typical EDI interchange in accordance with the present invention. Block 202 represents the preferred action of the server at the sender end with respect to this EDI interchange in accordance with the method of the present invention. As shown and preferred, the sender server preferably computes the MD5 for the entire EDI interchange, such as from ISA to the last character of IEA (termed MD5EDIINTERCHANGE). This value is then preferably inserted into a predetermined position in the AUTACK message, such as preferably the second element of segment USY in the AUTACK message. The sender server then preferably computes the MD5 of the AUTACK message, such as preferably from the first character of USH to the first character of UST. The sender server then preferably signs the AUTACK by encrypting the MD5 with the sender's private key. This computed value is then preferably inserted in a predetermined location in the AUTACK, such as preferably as the first element of segment USR in the AUTACK message. Block 204 represents a typical AUTACK message in accordance with the preferred method of the present invention after the sender server has taken the action illustrated in block 202. The AUTACK 204 is then preferably transmitted to the receiver server where the receiver action and verification illustrated in block 206 preferably takes place. If the EDI interchange is encrypted, then the receiver server preferably decrypts it and computes the MD5 of the received EDI interchange. Assuming that non-repudiation of origin is desired or requested, the receiver server then preferably, using the sender's public key, decrypts the contents of the first element of the USR segment in the AUTACK message 204, which is the location where the sender server has inserted the MD5 of the AUTACK. The value thus obtained by the decryption is the MD5 of the AUTACK message, in the above example, from the first character of USH to the first character of UST. The receiver server then preferably computes the MD5 of the AUTACK message and compares the computed MD5 with the value of the MD5 obtained by decrypting the contents of the first element of the USR segment in the AUTACK message. If both values of MD5 are equal, then the receiver server knows that the integrity of the AUTACK is preserved and non-repudiation of origin is established. The receiver server then preferably compares the MD5 of the EDI interchange with the MD5 in the USY segment of the AUTACK message, which is the location where the sender server has inserted the MD5 of the EDI interchange, and, if the two MD5 values are equal, the receiver server knows that the integrity of the EDI interchange is preserved, authenticity is verified, and non-repudiation of origin is established.

Referring now to FIG. 3, the preferred process of non-repudiation of receipt in accordance with the presently preferred method of the present invention shall now be described. As shown and preferred in block 208, the action of the receiver server in verifying the integrity and authenticity of the EDI interchange received is preferably as described above with respect to block 206 of FIG. 2. Thereafter, the receiver server preferably creates a new AUTACK, such as the AUTACK message represented by block 210, and transmits the new AUTACK 210 to the sender server for verification by the original sender server, as represented by block 212. As shown and preferred in FIG. 3, in creating the new AUTACK, the reciver server preferably populates all segments and elements as appropriate, such as all segments and elements up to and inclusive of UST. The receiver server then preferably computes the MD5 of the new AUTACK, such as from USH to the first character of UST, and signs the computed MD5 with the receiver's private key. The receiver server then preferably inserts the digitally signed MD5 into a predetermined location in the new AUTACK, such as the first element of the USR segment. The receiver server then preferably populates the UNT and UNZ segments of the new AUTACK as appropriate and transmits the prepared new AUTACK to the original sender server. The original sender server then preferably verifies the digital signature of the received new AUTACK by decrypting it with the receiver's public key, with the value obtained by this decryption being the MD5 of the received new AUTACK. The original sender server then computes the MD5 of the received new AUTACK and compares it against the value of the MD5 obtained from the decryption process. If the two values of MD5 are the same, then the original sender server knows that the integrity of the new AUTACK is preserved and non-repudiation of origin of the new AUTACK is established. The original sender server also knows that if the MD5 contained in the USY segment of the received new AUTACK in the above example is equal to the MD5 of the EDI interchange previously transmitted and the acknowledgement is positive (such as preferably obtained by testing the security code in the new AUTACK message), then the EDI interchange in question is known to both sender and receiver because the MD5 of the EDI interchange and the interchange number are contained in the AUTACK message and have been duly recognized. In addition, the integrity and authenticity of the EDI interchange upon receipt has been verified and the receiver sender does not deny having received the EDI interchange in question.

Referring now to FIGS. 4-5, a process flow diagram of the presently preferred method of receiving and sending E-mail, respectively, in accordance with the presently preferred method of the present invention is shown. In this regard, TEMPLAR, the controller for carrying out the opresently preferred method of the present invention, preferably sits between the conventional mailer and the user specified EDI flat-file on the sending and receiving systems, with the conventional SENDMAIL supplied with the UNIX X-WINDOWS OR MICROSOFT WINDOWS operating system being preferably used to send and receive mail, with the mail which is being sent and received preferably being MIME compliant, and with PKCS being preferably used to encrypt and decrypt MIME encoded body parts. Preferably, the MIME identifiers are not encrypted. As noted above, the EDIFACT AUTACK message is preferably used to deliver secure authentication, non-repudiation of origin and/or receipt, and acknowledgement or denial of acknowledgement for one or more X.12 or EDIFACT envelopes. Preferably, multiple EDI envelopes are viewed as one block of data in the system of the present invention. Preferably, if a received AUTACK message fails message integrity, an acknowledgement of receipt is not sent back to the original sender of the message, although, if desired, the system can be readily modified to accomplish this.

Referring now to FIGS. 6-9, these are process flow diagrams with respect to trading partner management, audit log management, tracking management, and job monitoring, respectively, in accordance with the presently preferred method of the present invention. These diagrams are self explanatory when considered in conjunction with the foregoing discussion and will not be described in any greater detail hereinafter.

FIG. 10 is a functional diagram of the organization of the presently preferred method of the present invention as represented by the script of TABLE A and the foregoing discussion and will not be described in any greater detail hereinafter.

Lastly, FIGS. 11A-13B comprise a process flow diagram of the presently preferred method of the present invention in accordance with the foregoing description, with FIGS. 11A and 11B illustrating various steps of verification of the integrity of the AUTACK, the EDI interchange, and the certificate, with NRO representing non-repudiation of origin and NRR representing non-repudiation of receipt. FIG. 12 illustrates the portion of the method devoted to TPA processing. FIGS. 13A and 13B illustrate the portion of the method of the present invention devoted to processing of the public and private keys, as well as TPA, in carrying out the method of the present invention as described above.

Thus, by utilizing the AUTACK message as a document for the digital signature which is signed based on a public/private key system, such as RSA, an efficient, highly secure mailer for EDI over an open network, such as the INTERNET, is provided in which trading partners may readily obtain secure verification and authentication and non-repudiation of both origin and receipt, all of which are important in fast moving electronic business transactions over a widely dispersed geographic area in which an open network is the most viable communication media.