System for Preventing Piracy of Recorded Media

The present invention relates to systems for preventing unauthorized copying of distributed information modules such as audio, video or software disks or tapes.

Unauthorized copying of recorded works has been a problem to the rightful owners of those works for centuries, providing a reason for the promulgation of copyright laws. With advances in technology, however, the ability to copy has become increasingly feasible and affordable. In particular, modern storage of information is often digital in nature, which allows repeated copying without incremental deterioration each time a copy is made. In addition, prerecorded audio, video or software programs often sell millions of legitimate copies, providing an incentive to those who may be tempted to risk running afoul of copyright laws to produce and sell pirated copies.

Several systems have been developed to thwart unauthorized copying. In U.S. Pat. No. 5,182,770, Medveczky et al. teach an integrated software piracy prevention system incorporating identification codes for installation and software components. The licensed software has an embedded program identification code, and an attached hardware device also has an embedded code, the hardware code and software code used to encrypt and decrypt the program and combining to provide an identification signature corresponding to a specific password. However, provision is not made for the situation in which the encryption code is broken and a number of copies of the software including the code are produced. U.S. Pat. No. 5,138,712 to Corbin provides a different approach to licensing software, in which a license server acts as an intermediary between an application program and a licensing library. This approach works best for computer networks allowing a restricted number of users to access the software at any given time.

In U.S. Pat. No. 5,291,554, Morales describes a pay per view television system that includes cryptographic keys for restricting access to movies and other video programs broadcast from a satellite to individual subscribers. Copying is possible once the programs have been decrypted by a subscriber. For communication systems such as radios and cellular telephones which are frequently operated, rekeying encryption codes of individual units such as telephones is employed to prevent unauthorized use of the communication system, as described in U.S. Pat. No. 5,173,938 to Steinbrenner et al. Further, U.S. Pat. Nos. 5,146,497 and 5,150,408 to Bright teach methods for providing such rekeying which corrects for delays in rekeying caused by communication, including resending rekeying messages when acknowledgement of the rekeying is not received from all of the communication units. U.S. Pat. No. 5,301,232 to Mulford teaches a key management system that determines whether individual communication units are using an old encryption scheme.

Despite these improvements, a need still exists to provide a better method for preventing unauthorized copying and distribution of prerecorded material such as audio, video and software programs. A particular object of the present invention is to provide protection against unauthorized copying and distribution, even in the event an encryption code designed to protect against such copying is broken.

The above object has been met with a system that allows for distribution of valuable recorded information such as audio, video or software programs on storage media such as optical or magnetic disks or tapes while protecting that information against unauthorized copying by making such copying difficult and uneconomical.

A number of information storage media each having a large data storage capacity for information that can be written, read and rewritten many times is provided, along with drives that can read and write data on the storage media. Information such as a prerecorded program is stored on the storage media in an encrypted form which can be decrypted by the associated drives. Each of the storage media may employ a different encryption code, limiting decryption of the stored information to a particular, mated drive. Among the encrypted information found in each storage medium is an individual identity code of that storage medium, which when inserted into a drive can provide an identity of a mated drive.

The drives are each equipped with a means for communicating with a host computer. Preferably such communication means include a satellite that transmits signals between the host computer and universal asynchronous receive and transmit (UART) chips connected to the drives. Alternatively, the communication between the host computer and the drives may be by means of a network of wires or telephone lines or a computer network, such as the Internet. The encrypted information on the storage medium and the encryption key of the drive allow limited reading of the encrypted information by the drive before the drive must be contacted by the host computer, ensuring that the drives remain in communication with the host computer.

The host computer periodically interrogates the drives regarding their identity or the identity of their associated storage media. The host computer also periodically revises the encryption codes of the drives or associated storage media, in order to make decoding the encryption codes more difficult. Upon receiving identities from the various drives the host computer checks for a duplicated identity of any of the drives or storage media. Since a duplicated identity indicates that a particular program has been copied without authorization, the host computer transmits signals to the drives which disable all of the drives or storage media having that duplicated identity. The host computer may also check the identities it has received against a list of authorized identities, and thereupon may disable any control or storage media having unauthorized identities.

In order to compensate any authorized owners having drives or storage media that were mistakenly disabled, the units are sold with a guarantee of replacement of several units or several times the purchase price if the units fail. However, since authorized units that have been disabled due to duplicate identities may be linked to unauthorized copying, this replacement offer may actually provide clues as to a source of illegal copying.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of the system of the present invention.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a method of employing the system of FIG. 1.

Referring now to FIG. 1, a system of the present invention has a first storage medium SM.sub.1 20 which stores encrypted information including an identification ID.sub.1 of SM.sub.1. SM.sub.1 may be an optical data recording disk or tape, a magnetic disk or tape, or a non-volatile semiconductor based memory such as flash memory card. The encrypted information may contain, for example, a movie or video game, an audio recording or a computer program.

In order to read the information which is stored on SM.sub.1 20, a drive DR.sub.1 22 is connected with SM.sub.1. DR.sub.1 22 also has a means for decrypting the encrypted information that is stored on SM1 20, so that the information can be displayed in a form suitable for human perception, typically involving sight and/or hearing, or use by another device such as a computer. In other words, DR.sub.1 22 is able to read and decrypt SM.sub.1 20, like a conventional tape player can play a prerecorded tape, so that the encrypted information stored on SM.sub.1 is accessible by a person or machine operating DR.sub.1. In order to decrypt the encrypted information stored on SM.sub.1 20, DR.sub.1 22 has electronic circuitry preferably combined with a non-volatile memory on a semiconductor chip, which is programmed with a key that unlocks the encryption with which the information on DR.sub.1 is stored.

A variety of encryption techniques may be employed for encrypting and decrypting the information on SM.sub.1, such as the well known RSA system described in U.S. Pat. No. 4,405,829. Due to other checks that are provided in the present invention, as described below, less sophisticated and more economical encryption techniques may be alternatively employed.

DR.sub.1 22 also has an attached transceiver TR.sub.1 25 which is able to send and receive messages from a host computer 28. The host computer is preferably in communication via a satellite, not shown, which provides wireless relay of signals between the host computer 28 and TR.sub.1 25. TR.sub.1 in this case is a universal asynchronous receive and transmit (UART) device that communicates packets of data between the drive DR.sub.1 22 and the host computer 28 via electromagnetic waves. In another embodiment, information is sent between DR.sub.1 22 and host computer 28 by means of electrically conductive or fiber optic wires, not shown, such as is available with telephone or computer networks, in which case TR.sub.1 is typically a modem or network connector, and signals to and from the host 28 are sent via a router.

Another information storage medium SM.sub.2 30, and its mated drive DR.sub.2 33 are also in communication with host computer 28 via a transceiver TR.sub.2 35. The information stored on SM.sub.2 may be very similar to that stored on SM.sub.1, except that SM.sub.2 has a different identity than SM.sub.1, and the information stored on SM.sub.2 is encrypted with a different code than that stored on SM.sub.1. D.sub.2 is programmed with a key which unlocks the encryption code of SM.sub.2. In practice, a great number (n) of mated pairs of storage media and drives, represented in FIG. 1 as DR.sub.n 38 and SM.sub.n 40, may exist in communication with host computer 28 via transceivers TR.sub.n 42, and the location of various mated pairs SM.sub.n and DR.sub.n and attached transceivers TR.sub.n may be geographically diverse. It is also possible that for each drive DR.sub.z a variable number of storage media SM.sub.a -SM.sub.e exist, provided that the drive D.sub.Z can decrypt information on each of the storage media SM.sub.a -SM.sub.e.

In operation, beginning somewhat arbitrarily with encrypted information stored on SM.sub.1, DR.sub.1 reads and decrypts information from SM.sub.1, including reading the identity ID.sub.1 of SM.sub.1, as shown in step 44. This step 44 could have been prompted by either an operator using DR.sub.1 to decrypt the information in SM.sub.1 or by polling from the host computer 28 to verify the authenticity of the storage media SM.sub.n. If the step 44 was operator requested, DR.sub.1 then provides the decrypted information to a connected device such as a television or personal computer for display or use by the operator, as shown in step 46. If the step 44 was requested by the host computer 28, DR.sub.1 22 then sends ID.sub.1 to the host 28 without displaying decrypted information, as shown in step 48. Since a request for identification is sent from the host computer 28 to all pairs of storage and drives DR.sub.1 -DR.sub.N and SM.sub.1, other drives DR.sub.1 -DR.sub.N also send their identification ID.sub.1 -ID.sub.N to the host 28, via transmitters TR.sub.1 -TR.sub.N.

The host computer 28 performs several operations upon receipt of the identifications ID.sub.1 -ID.sub.N. First, the host 28 checks the identifications ID.sub.1 -ID.sub.N against a list of authorized identifications, the list of authorized identifications corresponding to those storage media which were sold or licensed. Any identification ID.sub.x which is received by the host 28 that does not match with an identification on the authorized list is stored by the host 28. Second, the host 28 checks the identifications ID.sub.1 -ID.sub.N that it has received from transmitters TR.sub.1 -TR.sub.N for duplicate identifications. Note that this operation of checking for duplicate identifications can be performed previous to or concurrently with the operation of checking for unauthorized identifications. Note also that the identifications ID.sub.1 -ID.sub.N may actually be the encryption codes or keys with which the information is encrypted and decrypted. Any identification ID.sub.y which is received by the host 28 that matches with another identification ID.sub.y received by the host 28 is stored.

Upon storing any identifications ID.sub.x or ID.sub.y that indicate either the use of an unauthorized copy of the information or the unauthorized copying of that information, the host computer 28 has a number of options. The host 28 can send disabling signals to the transmitters TR.sub.x and TR.sub.y that are associated, respectively, with the unauthorized identification ID.sub.x and the copied identification ID.sub.y, and that disable either the respective storage media SM.sub.x and SM.sub.y or drives DR.sub.x and DR.sub.y, as shown in step 50, in which DR.sub.2 or SM.sub.2 is disabled. Such disabling signals can, for example, involve changing an encryption code of either a drive or a mated storage medium, but not both, so that the drive cannot decrypt information from the storage medium. Alternatively, the host computer 28 may be programmed, for instance, to allow for a single duplicate identity ID.sub.y without disabling corresponding storage media SM.sub.y or drives DR.sub.y, so that archival copying or home copying is not prevented, but to disable DR.sub.y or SM.sub.y if multiple duplicates of ID.sub.y are discovered by the host computer 28, thereby rendering unauthorized copying worthless. Another option that may be employed by the host 28 is to find the location of the TR.sub.x or TR.sub.y associated with unauthorized or duplicated programs, for enforcement of copyright laws.

The host computer 28 also periodically or in response to each identification check sends out revised encryption codes to transmitters such as TR.sub.1 which have an identification ID.sub.1 which is neither unauthorized nor duplicated, as shown in step 52. For the case in which the encryption codes or keys correspond with the identifications, revising the encryption codes also results in revising the identifications ID.sub.1 -ID.sub.N of each of the mated pairs DR.sub.1 -DR.sub.N and SM.sub.1 -SM.sub.N. For example, the transceiver TR.sub.1 transmits the revised encryption to the connected controller DR.sub.1, which then rewrites the information stored on storage medium SM.sub.1 in encrypted form with the new encryption key, as shown in step 54.

To ensure the maintenance of communication between the drives DR.sub.1 -DR.sub.N and the host computer 28, the storage media SM.sub.1 -SM.sub.N are restricted in the number of times they can be read before contact is made with the host 28. This restriction may be enforced, for example, by rewriting a small part of the encrypted information with each reading of storage media SM.sub.1 -SM.sub.N. After a set number of readings, decryption of the information would be disallowed, and a message displayed to the operator that contact with the host 28 is necessary. Alternatively, communication with the host 28 may be required after each reading of information by one of the drives DR.sub.1 -DR.sub.N. As another example, the drives DR.sub.1 -DR.sub.N may have timers which require a periodic contact with the host 28 on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. In this case an update may occur overnight or with the first time during a day that a computer, television or other device connected to the drive is turned on.

Referring now to FIG. 2, a method of the present invention is illustrated, beginning at step 60 with providing storage media SM.sub.1 -SM.sub.N, driver DR.sub.1 -DR.sub.N, transceivers TR.sub.1 -TR.sub.N and a host computer. Since this system utilizes mated drives DR.sub.1 -DR.sub.N and storage media SM.sub.1 -SM.sub.N, it is preferably implemented with a new portable storage technology that does not have an installed base of drive units. Such storage technologies may include, for instance, optical tapes or disks and their associated drive mechanisms, flash memory card systems or ferroelectric memory systems. Alternatively, add on hardware or software keys, and transceivers if needed, could be provided along with prerecorded software for existing computer drives. Due to the large amounts of money estimated to be lost by producers of valuable information such as computer software to unauthorized copying, the cost of adding encryption keys to the software may well prove to be economical.

The encrypted information and identifications ID.sub.1 -ID.sub.N are then stored 63 in storage media SM.sub.1 -SM.sub.N. Encryption keys are provided 65 to the drives DR.sub.1-n that mate with the storage media SM.sub.1 -SM.sub.N. Note that the encryption keys may be preprogrammed in DR.sub.1 -DR.sub.N or may be provided by the host computer upon communication of DR.sub.1 -DR.sub.N with that host computer. The encrypted information and identifications ID.sub.1 -ID.sub.N are then read 67 by one or more of the drives DR.sub.1 -DR.sub.n. With the drives DR.sub.1 -Dr.sub.n having keys matching their respective storage media SM.sub.1 -SM.sub.N, the encrypted information can then be decrypted 70 by the one or more of drives DR.sub.1 -DR.sub.N. The decrypted information can then be displayed or otherwise used 72 by a person or machine operator.

Either in response to an interrogation 75 of DR.sub.1 -DR.sub.N by the host computer, or a periodic or use based identification requirement as described above, the identifications ID.sub.1 -ID.sub.N are transmitted 77 from drives DR.sub.1 -DR.sub.N to the host computer. The host computer then compares 80 identifications ID.sub.1 -ID.sub.N with each other and with a list of authorized identifications. If one of those identifications ID.sub.x is unauthorized or duplicated, as shown in decision block 82, either DR.sub.x or SM.sub.x may be disabled 85 by the host computer. Upon discovering that their units DR.sub.x or SM.sub.x are no longer operable, authorized owners of the units are encouraged to return their units for replacement 88 by an offer, communicated to the owners at the time of purchase, of receiving replacement money or programs worth several times the purchase price. Such disablement also helps to track unauthorized copying, as holders of unauthorized copies of information may be tempted to bring their storage media SM.sub.x for repair or replacement. Also, for the situation in which an authorized storage medium SM.sub.x is returned that is recognized by the host computer upon the return as being a storage medium for which a number of duplicate identifications ID.sub.x are stored, an indication of a source of illegal copying may have been discovered.

Returning now to decision block 82, for identifications ID.sub.1 -ID.sub.N which are authorized and not duplicated, new encryption codes may be transmitted 90 from the host computer to DR.sub.1 -DR.sub.N via TR.sub.1 -TR.sub.N. These new codes are used to re-encrypt 93 the information and identifications ID.sub.1 -ID.sub.N on SM.sub.1 -SM.sub.n. The drives DR.sub.1 -DR.sub.n are then able to be used again to decrypt the encrypted information held in storage media SM.sub.1 -SM.sub.N, as shown in step 95, after which the information can be displayed or used 72. The identifications ID.sub.1 -ID.sub.N may also be transmitted 77 to the host computer at this time, periodically or in response to an inquiry from the host computer.